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I. Introduction
Corporate law—in theory, in statute, and in practice—is
oriented around the idea of shareholder primacy.1 A sizeable and
prestigious swath of the corporate law academy has adopted
shareholder wealth maximization as the field’s normative
touchstone,2 uses finance-based law and economics as the field’s

* Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Visiting
Professor, Harvard Law School (Fall 2016). This essay was presented as part of
the 2016 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium on Corporate Law, Governance, and
Purpose: A Tribute to the Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon. I am
indebted to Lyman and David for their rich contributions to corporate law
literature, their comments on my presentation, and their advice and support
during my career. My thanks to the Law Review editors, particularly Mitchell
Diles, McNair Nichols, and James Simon. And this essay has benefited from
thoughts and comments from Ron Colombo, Andrew Gold, Brett McDonnell,
Andrew Johnston, Harwell Wells, and David Yosifon.
1. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
280 (1998) (“The shareholder primacy norm is considered fundamental to
corporate law.”).
2. See David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
1013, 1014 (2013) (noting that “proponents of radical shareholder
primacy . . . include most of the biggest names in the corporate law academy”).
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primary methodology,3 and employs share-price-oriented event
studies to assess the success and failure of various corporate law
doctrines empirically.4 In contrast, progressive corporate law has
provided resistance to the law and economics movement, has
drawn upon alternative disciplines for its research and analysis,
and seeks to move beyond shareholder primacy to a
communitarian vision of the corporation.5 In so doing, progressive
corporate law has provided an important intellectual
counterweight to the predominant paradigm.
Ultimately, however, progressive corporate law must change
if it is to continue to provide shareholder primacy with a robust
academic alternative. In many ways, progressive theory remains
trapped in the dialectic with corporate law and economics that
began in the 1980s.6 Thus far, it has not won the argument.7 My
recommendations are for significant changes in the literature upon
which progressive corporate law draws; changes in the conception
3. See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 342, 345–46 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, After the Revolution] (describing
the “revolution” of modern finance becoming a cornerstone methodology in the
study of corporate law).
4. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639 (2006) (“An increasing number of
scholars in law, economics, finance, and related fields are using event studies,
regression analysis, and other statistical tools to evaluate the effect of corporate
law on firm value.”).
5. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations
and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 3 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon, Foundations] (describing “the central
communitarian tenet” as “the willingness to talk about obligations existing
independently of consent and a consequent unwillingness to allow bargaining
power disparities to prevent substantively just outcomes”).
6. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1993) [hereinafter Millon,
Communitarians] (“[G]iven the depth of disagreement [between shareholder
primacy advocates and communitarians], it should come as no surprise that no
realistic possibility of compromise has yet emerged . . . . The crisis is here, and we
should expect it to continue.”).
7. For arguments against progressive corporate law from a mainstream
corporate law perspective, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism:
A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 903 (1997) (criticizing the progressive agenda as
“unlikely to make much headway . . . [because] it fails to offer . . . a model for
predicting human behavior that seems capable of displacing those successfully
employed by mainstream law and economics scholars . . . [and] its communitarian
elements . . . run counter to the spirit of a democratic capitalist society”).
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of the corporation upon which it builds; and changes in the types
of reforms for which it advocates. In brief, I argue that progressive
corporate law should draw upon economic literature concerning
the theory of the firm; should focus on employees and shareholders
as the true participants in the firm; and should advocate for
structural changes in corporate governance. These changes will
likely not be amenable to those who remain comfortable with the
communitarian, CSR-oriented approach that has characterized
progressive corporate law. But we are stuck in a rut. Below I
discuss why progressive corporate law needs to head in new
directions and how it can do so.
II. Moving to the Theory of the Firm
When law and economics burst onto the corporate law scene
in the 1980s, it had a significant advantage over its doctrinal
rivals: namely, a rigorous interdisciplinary methodology that could
be applied to arrive at doctrinal answers.8 In some ways, the
corporate law and economics revolution was a part of the broader
law and economics movement that began sweeping the academy in
the 1970s.9 That revolution—based largely on using the tools of
microeconomic analysis to resolve legal questions—endeavored to
reexamine and retheorize all areas of law, from torts and contracts
to family law and constitutional theory.10 However, corporate law
had its own tradition of using economics. In 1965, Henry Manne’s
8. See Romano, After the Revolution, supra note 3, at 342 (“Corporate law is
a field that underwent as thorough a revolution in the 1980s as can be imagined,
in scholarship and in practice, methodology, and organization . . . . This
revolution has produced one of the more interdisciplinary fields of law.”).
9. See Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Functional Law and Economics:
The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, in LAW AND ECONOMICS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 104, 105 (Aristides N.
Hatzis & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2015) (describing the increased use of economic
analysis to achieve a better understanding of the legal system that existed in the
1970s which “gradually exposed the economic structure of basically every aspect
of a legal system, from its origin and evolution, to substantive, procedural, and
constitutional rules”). A foundational work in the field is RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
10. See Klick & Parisi, supra note 9, at 105 (“[T]he incorporations of
economics into the study of law was to transform traditional legal methodology
irreversibly.”).
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article on takeovers introduced the notion of economic concepts to
challenge existing doctrinal precepts.11 And in 1972—the same
year as Posner’s first treatise—Victor Brudney and Marvin
Chirelstein published their casebook on corporate finance.12
Roberta Romano specifically credits their casebook with
“introduc[ing] a new methodology, modern finance, into the
business law curriculum.”13
Ever since, mainstream corporate law and economics has had
a rigorous set of interdisciplinary research upon which to draw
insights about corporate behavior.14 Using economic modeling,
corporate law academics can work through specific scenarios and
develop algorithms to resolve questions about likely responses to
various inputs within the model.15 Models can definitively
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, one set of actions will
provide greater efficiency than others.16 In conjunction with these
models, quantitative analysis of stock prices and other corporate
economic data can provide empirical results to illuminate
11. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see George L. Priest, Henry Manne and the Market
Measure of Intellectual Influence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 327 (1999) (“Law
and economics is an intellectual movement and the person most centrally
responsible for its influence in a market sense is Henry Manne.”).
12. VICTOR BRUDNEY AND MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE (1972).
13. See Romano, After the Revolution, supra note 3, at 345 (“It should also be
evident that the intellectual roots of modern corporate law scholarship are quite
distinct from the standard microeconomic methodology applied in the law and
economics literature.”).
14. See Richard A. Posner, Norms and Values in the Economic Approach to
Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL
QUESTIONS, supra note 9, at 1, 2 (observing that since the 1970s, “the law and
economics movement has become geographically, politically, thematically, and
methodologically diverse—as well as much larger, more specialized, more
rigorous, more influential, more orthodox”).
15. See Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker, Introduction to RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF LAW 1 (Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker
eds., 2013) (“The usefulness of [economic] models is that they allow the analyst to
focus on answering a specific question with respect to a particular legal rule under
scrutiny, and to derive a clear understanding as to what its effects will be . . . .”).
16. See John E. Noyes, An Introduction to Law and Economics by A. Mitchell
Polinsky, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 410, 414 (1984) (“Economic analysis allows clear and
consistent definitions of terms and formulations of concepts. The resulting models
appear precise, even elegant. One need apply few tests to determine whether a
legal rule is a good one; efficiency is the central criterion.”).
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underlying debates.17 This double methodological punch has
proven quite powerful in reshaping the corporate law field.18
The widespread adoption of financial economics and
corresponding empirical analysis does leave open the opportunity
for cogent critique. And in fact, progressive corporate law scholars
have attacked the premise of corporate law and economics—
specifically, shareholder wealth maximization—as well as the
focus on financial returns to shares as the normative driver for the
scholarship.19 For the empirical work to match up with the theory,
the models must aim for shareholder wealth maximization.20
These premises have been challenged on two fronts. First, a variety
of commentators have challenged the literature on its own terms
by arguing that shareholder wealth maximization must be
measured in the long term.21 Event studies often measure
17. See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate
Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1538 (1989) (“In corporate
law today, relatively simple econometric techniques and the availability of stockprice data have made it possible to test hypotheses about firm governance and
performance.”).
18. Many corporate law scholars employ both theoretical and empirical tools
in conducting their research. See Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of
Empirical Research in Corporate Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982 (2004)
(discussing the “explosion in the number of theoretical articles that combine
theoretical and empirical elements”).
19. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarians, supra note 6, at 1373–74 (“[T]he
orthodox assumption [about corporate law’s normative foundations] has been that
corporate law’s objective is to . . . maximize shareholder wealth . . . . [This vision]
disregards claims of various nonshareholder constituencies . . . whose interests
may be adversely affected by managerial pursuit of shareholder
welfare . . . [which] is corporate law’s central problem.”).
20. See Romano, After the Revolution, supra note 3, at 356
[P]olicy disputes are, at least in principle, resolvable empirically when
there is consensus on ends, as there is among most U.S. corporate law
scholars since the field was transformed with the application of finance
and the theory of the firm (a consensus that the objective of public, forprofit corporations is to maximize shareholder wealth).
21. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Enron] (stating that
shareholder value maximization has resulted in an obsession with “short-term
performance numbers”); Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006) [hereinafter
Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic] (discussing the increasing focus on
quarter-to-quarter earnings); Lynn A. Stout, Why Carl Icahn Is Bad for Investors,
WALL STREET J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A11 (stating that “activist” shareholders are
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movements within a narrow time horizon.22 Such specific slices of
time help to isolate the studied effects, but they may fail to catch
longer-term trends that would undercut the initial findings.23
Especially since the 2008 financial crisis, both academic research
and the popular financial press have called the efficient capital
markets hypothesis into question, particularly in the short-term.24
The focus on finance more generally has been blamed for many of
our long-term economic ills, particularly income inequality.25
As for the second challenge, many have questioned the focus
on share price as the sine qua non of empirical testing.26
Stakeholder theory has long argued that the purpose of the
corporation is not to maximize shareholder wealth, but rather to
maximize the benefits provided to all those who participate in the
life of the business, including employees, creditors, suppliers,
consumers, and the community, along with shareholders.27
Stakeholder theorists have not necessarily agreed on the
usually short-termers). But see George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of
Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97,
100–01 (2010) (arguing that shareholders do not have a problem with short-term
focus).
22. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 642–44 (discussing the focus of event studies
of share-price movements).
23. See id. at 661 (noting that “absent perfect market efficiency, short-term
performance and value indicators, such as profitability and stock price, may not
accurately reflect the long-term value of operational decisions”).
24. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2421
(2014) (“This view of market efficiency has since lost its luster.”); Donald
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
151, 175 (2009) (“Doubts about the strength and pervasiveness of market
efficiency are much greater today than they were in the mid–1980s.”); Baruch Lev
& Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal,
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994) (“Not surprisingly,
overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that capital markets are not
fundamentally efficient.”). See generally JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL
MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 28 (2011).
25. For critiques of overreliance on finance within the economy, see RANA
FOROOHAR, MAKERS & TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE FALL OF AMERICAN
BUSINESS (2016); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW
FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY (2008).
26. See Roberto Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA.
L. REV. 111, 113 (1987) (stating that “the core goal of corporation law” is “the
maximization of equity share prices”).
27. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 9–10 (2008) (discussing stakeholder theory).
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appropriate methods for calculating the appropriate normative
target, if such a target were even ascertainable.28 But share prices
themselves are arguably insufficient to bear the full weight of the
enterprise.29 Even scholars who participate in the ongoing
theoretical and empirical literature have expressed concern that
corporate law scholarship has become too narrowly focused on
event studies that track changes in stock prices.30 By balancing the
entire discipline largely on a specific kind of study, measuring a
specific kind of data, the current corporate law literature is ripe for
a countermovement designed to present a fuller picture.
The problem, at present, is that the countermovement lacks a
normative foundation of its own upon which to build its critique.
Progressive corporate law—construed broadly—has drawn upon a
variety of sources in its research, such as doctrinal analysis,
history, basic law and economics, sociological research, and
philosophical precepts. Ultimately, however, there has been no
sustained and meaningful exploration of an alternative
methodology by a group of scholars working in the area.31
I have argued in the past that scholars looking for a response
to the dominant law and economics narrative need not forego
economics to develop an alternative approach.32 The literature on
the theory of the firm endeavors to answer the same question that
lies at the heart of corporate law: why do we have firms in the first
28. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 25.
29. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 638 (“[T]he measures of shareholder value
typically employed by empirical scholars—particularly short-term stock price—
are problematic as indicators of firm value and may reinforce inappropriate
managerial decisions.”).
30. See id. (“[E]mpirical scholars need to offer better and explicit
justifications for their reliance on shareholder wealth and, more importantly, for
their argument that shareholder wealth effects should dominate regulatory
policy.”). For an example of Fisch’s own empirical scholarship, see Stephen J. Choi
et. al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1119 (2016).
31. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 874 (“Although Progressive Corporate
Law’s authors are united in their rejection of the contractarian model and of the
Economic Man model, they achieve less unity in offering an alternative theory of
the firm.”).
32. See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law:
Returning to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (2012) (“The
economic literature on the theory of the firm should be attractive to scholars
looking to push into new frontiers in corporate law because it has the imprimatur
of the current corporate law establishment, and yet is relatively underexplored.”).
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place?33 In mainstream corporate law and economics, this is a
settled question: the corporation exists to maximize shareholder
wealth.34 But this is a deeply unsettling answer from an economic
perspective, as it does not explain why the corporate form needs to
exist outside of the market.35 Along these same lines, mainstream
law and economics relies primarily on the “nexus of contract”
theory to provide the structural basis for their theories.36 However,
the nexus of contract theory endeavors to understand relationships
within existing firms; it is not itself a theory of the firm.37 As Oliver
Hart has argued: “the nexus of contracts approach does less to
resolve the questions of what a firm is than to shift the terms of
the debate.”38
33. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757–65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).
34. William Bratton, however, recently arrived at the following alternative
description of corporate law purpose:
We set out to frame an accurate and uncontroversial statement of
purpose for corporate law. Here is the result: corporate law should
facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence
wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment
at the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control
externalities. Many would expect a tighter focus on maximization, but
feasibility constraints preclude it. A more specific shareholder value
objective would be both descriptively inaccurate and controversial.
Finally, social welfare enhancement, while desirable, lies outside the
limited sphere occupied by corporate law.
William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713,
723–24 (2014).
35. Cf. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 79–84 (2010)
(attributing the corporation’s success as an organizational form to its limited
liability for shareholders); Hart, supra note 33, at 1764 (discussing the
weaknesses of corporate theory as a theory of the firm).
36. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8–12 (1991) (describing nexus of contracts theory
as “a shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who
associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves”).
37. See Thomas McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production
and Work Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2004) (“Scholars working in this paradigm do
not offer theories of the firm so much as theories of who controls the firm.”);
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2001)
(“Jensen and Meckling, despite the title, did not really offer a full-fledged theory
of the firm. Rather, they offered a theory of agency costs within firms . . . .”).
38. Hart, supra note 33, at 1764.
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The theory of the firm literature, on the other hand, offers a
deep and expanding pool of research upon which to draw in seeking
to understand the “why” of firms. Progressive corporate law
scholars are not content with the status quo; they seek to upend
the settled doctrines of shareholder primacy and nexus of contract
theory to provide to a more ecumenical, egalitarian corporate
structure.39 Too often, however, progressive scholars have ceded
the realm of economics for less defined, and arguably less rigorous,
approaches.40 The theory of the firm offers a sustained
interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of firms (and their legal
instantiations).41 Of course, much of the current work in other
social sciences, such as psychology and sociology, dovetails with
economic theory and provides additional insights into the basic
economic models.42 The theory of the firm offers a starting point for
39. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate
Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 674–75 (2002)
There is no uniformity among progressives but we share a concern that
corporate law should treat public corporations as at least quasi-public
institutions that must be viewed holistically as more than the sum of
their privately ordered constituencies. Progressives are also concerned
with the interests of corporate constituencies who cannot adequately
protect themselves by contract. Progressive legal scholars tend to
consider norms of behavior, especially as they involve fairness and
social responsibility, and how such norms interact with legal rules. In
doing this, our work increasingly utilizes insights from the behavioral
sciences.
40. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 859
Progressive Corporate Law's contributing authors, if pressed hard
enough, would most likely not deny the relevance of economic
principles to the study of corporate law. To the contrary, many of them
make explicit use of selected economic tools. It is thus not economics
per se to which they object, but rather to the specific economic models
of firms and human behavior embraced by the law and economics
school of corporate law and, sub silentio, to the unwillingness of those
in the mainstream of law and economics to acknowledge those writing
outside the prevailing paradigm.
41. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
(2013) (describing the legal theories of firms as foundational to understanding
how firms are formed, for what purposes, and how firms function as
organizational “persons”); Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988) (exploring the firm as a distinct legal and organizational
form).
42. See Bodie, supra note 32, at 1057 (noting that “the different social science
disciplines—economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology—are increasingly
borrowing from one another and bleeding into each other’s work”); see also THE
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these inquiries and a basis upon which to build an alternative
academic narrative.
III. Employees, Not Stakeholders
In contrast to shareholder primacy—a term first coined by
David Millon and Lyman Johnson—progressive corporate law
theorists have generally advocated for a stakeholder model of the
corporation.43 Also called the communitarian or multifiduciary
model,44 stakeholder theory argues that corporate governance
should take all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise into
account.45 In a sense, it draws upon the nexus of contract theory in
identifying the many participants who have a role in conducting
the business of the corporation. However, unlike the law and
economics contractarians who limit organizational protections to
shareholders, stakeholder advocates argue that all participants
deserve consideration.46 Stakeholder reforms have generally
centered around weakening shareholder power within the
organizational structure and increasing managerial discretion to
take other interests into account.47
FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) (taking an
organizational behavior approach to the question of the firm).
43. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State
Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989) (discussing a “deliberate
rejection of the shareholder primacy norm”).
44. See Simone M. Sepe, Directors’ Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract,
1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 553, 561 (2007) (noting that “communitarians . . . advocate a
multifiduciary model where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the
attribution of directors’ fiduciary duties”); see also Millon, Foundations, supra
note 5, at 11–12 (discussing the use of the multifiduciary model by communitarian
corporate law scholars).
45. See Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 11–12 (discussing efforts to
provide protections to nonshareholder constituencies); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 293–
94 (1999) (arguing that directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the
corporation consists of all of the stakeholders who are responsible for the business
of the enterprise).
46. See Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 11 (noting especially those
whose interests may be negatively affected by the pursuit of shareholder interests
and welfare).
47. See id. (rejecting the principles underlying shareholder primacy); Blair
& Stout, supra note 45, at 280–81 (describing directors as “trustees for the
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Progressive corporate law needs to move away from
stakeholder theory. First, the antagonism towards shareholders
has blinded stakeholder theorists to the need to reinforce
shareholder power against managerial corruption.48 The story of
the shareholder rights movement, going back to Berle and Means,
is one that should resonate with progressives: it is the story of an
undifferentiated mass of powerless shareholders separated from
meaningful control, and the managers that then take advantage of
this vacuum.49 As one example, progressives might very well
applaud efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission to
allow easier shareholder proxy access as a way to prevent boards
and officers from assuming unlimited power.50 Shareholder
participation through Rule 14a-851 proposals provides a way for
injecting environmental, moral, or political issues into the internal
corporate realm.52 Interestingly, the traditional law and economics
academy has fractured over shareholder empowerment, with
shareholder advocates such as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried
advocating against inflated CEO compensation,53 while traditional
corporation itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’
competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the
productive coalition stays together”).
48. See Smith, supra note 1, at 281 n.11 (“In most situations, shareholder
and nonshareholder constituency interests coincide . . . despite the shareholder
wealth maximization norm. . . . [D]irectors and officers often take nonshareholder
constituency interests into account. This is not particularly surprising because no
one . . . seriously expects managers to leave their ethical and moral concerns at
home.”).
49. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the internal organization
of the corporation in modern society and, specifically, the separation of ownership
from control of the modern corporation and its consequences).
50. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and
Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 103–08 (2012)
(discussing the history of SEC proxy-access efforts up through the former Rule
14a-11).
51. Rule 14a-8, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18 (2016).
52. See H. Rodgin Cohen & Glen T. Schleyer, Shareholder vs. Director
Control over Social Policy Matters: Conflicting Trends in Corporate Governance,
26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 82 (2012) (noting the presence of
“shareholder proposals on social issues, including environmental, political,
non-discrimination, and health-related issues, as well as executive compensation
practices”).
53. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
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law and economics proponents such as Joseph Grundfest and
Stephen Bainbridge argue against increased shareholder power,
even as they stand by shareholder wealth maximization.54 In my
view, there is a progressive side to these debates, and it is the one
that the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) has supported.55 But the progressive
corporate law movement has largely avoided these debates, or—
worse, in my view—sided with management. 56
But secondly, and more importantly for our purposes,
stakeholder theory does not provide a stable foundation for a
theory of corporate governance. As an oppositional theory,
stakeholder theory has largely served to act as a rhetorical brake
on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.57 When confronted
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (illuminating
structural flaws in corporate governance that produce widespread distortions in
executive pay).
54. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 603 (2006) (“Such efforts to extend
the shareholder franchise are fundamentally misguided.”); Joseph A. Grundfest,
The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS.
LAW. 361, 380 (2010) (contending that increased shareholder power can “impair
shareholder value”).
55. See Marleen A. O’Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist:
Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1350
(1997) (“Labor-shareholder activism has significant symbolic value because it
highlights the fact that working people are the beneficiaries of many
institutional shareholders.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas,
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019–20 (1998) (finding that “labor activism is a model for
any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital”);
Damon Silvers, Commentary on “Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational
System of Corporate Governance” by Leo E. Strine, Jr., 33 J. CORP. L. 85, 87 (2007)
(“The AFL-CIO has been engaged in a number of efforts over the last five years
to build bridges between long-term investors and the CEO community around the
theory that there should be a shared commitment to the long-term health of
enterprises.”).
56. See Christopher Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance:
What Is the 'Progressive' Agenda? (SSRN Working Paper, February 15,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2917253 (discussing the seemingly paradoxical
approaches taken by different progressive groups as to various corporate
governance matters).
57. For a discussion of those excesses, see Bratton, Enron, supra note 21;
Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
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with the task of providing an alternative structure, stakeholder
theory has served up relatively weak sauce.58 Under stakeholder
theory, corporate governance structure looks pretty much the same
as it does now.59 If anything, stakeholder theory expands upon the
discretion provided to the board—and the management selected by
the board—to follow their own judgment in contravention to the
will of the shareholders.60 The most important tangible
contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate law is the
constituency statute, which is the law in a majority of states (but
not Delaware).61 The constituency statute provides directors with
the discretion to take the interests of all stakeholders into account
when making certain types of decisions.62 Directors need not take
other interests into account, and there is generally no remedy for
other stakeholders.63 These statutes are just a way of insulating
directors from claims that they failed to do enough for shareholders
when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown.64
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at
least at present, a real theory of firm governance. As the theory of
the firm teaches, governance is necessary when enforceable
contract terms are insufficient to protect the interests of the
58. See Millon, Communitarians, supra note 6, at 1387 (“Those who say that
[progressive scholars] have not yet articulated a fully developed alternative
agenda are correct.”).
59. See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the
Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2091–92
(2010) [hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy] (discussing the
Blair and Stout “mediating hierarch” approach).
60. See id. (discussing how the “mediating hierarch” board is insulated in
order to serve all stakeholders).
61. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006)
(finding that thirty-one states have constituency statutes).
62. Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions.
See Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“[Constituency] statutes take
varying forms, but they share a common agenda. Each declares that the board of
directors, in the course of making corporate decisions, may . . . consider various
enumerated nonshareholder interests.”).
63. See id. at 13 (“To the extent that management must compromise its
commitment to shareholder interests for the sake of nonshareholders,
shareholders stand to lose.”).
64. See id. at 13–14 (describing the difficulties faced by corporate
management when they are accountable to multiple constituencies despite their
potentially “conflicting interest”).
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parties involved.65 Firms develop as “islands of conscious power”
within the market because they manage issues that could not
otherwise be handled by the market.66 Although the participants
are in fact in contractual relationships, these relationships are
sufficiently incomplete so as to suffer serious enforcement flaws. 67
As a result, a firm structure is necessary to structure the contracts
and provide a mechanism for resolving disputes within the firm.68
Even though the nexus of contract theory would seem to be
antithetical to the theory of the firm, it does in fact provide a
rationale for firms and for shareholder primacy. As developed at
length in Easterbrook and Fischel’s The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, the theory provides: shareholders suffer serious
contractual vulnerability at the hands of firm management, who
have complete discretion over the returns allocated to
shareholders.69 Shareholders are given voting rights to protect
themselves against opportunism by firm management.70 The other
firm participants can more easily protect themselves through
contract.71 But because shareholders hold rights to the residual,
they are the best locus of voting power to incentivize the firm to
maximize utility for all participants.72

65. See Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 369, 373 (2005) (“Governance problems are posed when
incomplete contracts (to include unforeseen contingencies) are combined with
opportunism.”).
66. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937)
(quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)).
67. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1621 (contending that legal
governance relations are insufficient to manage the economic firm on their own).
68. See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
74, 80 (1999) (“When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot
incorporate
all
future
contracting
opportunities, governance becomes
consequential.”).
69. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 68–69.
70. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1699 (describing one method for
“mitigating the potential for opportunism” that can be “accomplished by assigning
voting rights to shareholders”).
71. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 659 (“[T]he scope of protection afforded to
stakeholder interests depends on the quality of contractual protection.”).
72. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 68 (“As the residual
claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incentives . . . to make
discretionary decisions . . . .”).

PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW

753

Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, lacks a model for
allocating governance rights and responsibilities among the
participants.73 It could be argued that stakeholder theory is more
in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, since it treats all the
participants in the firm as deserving of governance consideration.74
However, it fails to develop a system for managing the different
stakeholders within the firm.75 Stakeholder theory does not, for
example, argue that corporations are simply contractual nexuses
and, thus, should not exist as legal entities.76 Nor, more
surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system
whereby all stakeholders can participate in firm governance.
Instead, stakeholder theorists have largely glommed on to the
existing structure of corporate law, whereby shareholders elect
directors who appoint officers.77 The only real difference is that

73. See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 533, 543 (2006) (arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency
risks” because of the potential for conflicts); Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting
a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that
stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of mechanisms for governance, other
than “balancing” stakeholder concerns).
74. See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation?
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Modern Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 641, 666 (2011) (“[S]takeholder theories based on the idea of specific
investment of other corporate constituencies . . . [assume] that regular contracts
do not provide complete protection for these groups, but are still firmly grounded
within the nexus [of contracts] framework.”).
75. See Orts & Strudler, supra note 73, at 609 (claiming that the vagueness
of stakeholder theory “is pernicious because it tells us to balance stakeholder
interests, but does not say anything about how to determine who (or what) counts
as a stakeholder . . . or how to determine when an appropriate balancing has
occurred”).
76. Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the
corporation, which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate
entity. See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From
Nature to Function, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013)
CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified consideration of
broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm as not merely
a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism with social and ethical
responsibilities, or built upon the view of the corporation as an entity
existing in time and as a distinct person.
77. See Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 59, at 2113
(discussing examples).
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under stakeholder theory, directors have more discretion to act in
the interests of all stakeholders.78
It might be possible for stakeholder theory to develop a new
system of corporate governance whereby all stakeholders have
direct ways to participate in firm governance. But such theorists
would have to do the difficult work of assigning rights to all
participants in a meaningful way—beyond the contractual
protections they already hold. The whole point of firm governance
is to move beyond contract.79 Yet stakeholder theory seems content
with the current power structure, as long as directors do not get
too beholden to their electorate. This approach is not internally
coherent. As Grant Hayden and I have argued in an earlier article,
it makes little sense to attack shareholder primacy but then
maintain the exclusive shareholder franchise.80 Stakeholder
theory has failed to present a viable alternative to the status
quo/shareholder primacy model; at best, it advocates for a
watered-down version of shareholder primacy.
Progressive corporate law needs a new model. Instead of
treating all stakeholders equally, progressives should focus on two
types of stakeholders: shareholders and employees. These are the
stakeholders who are invested in the firm in such a way that they
need firm governance to protect against opportunism. As
contractarians have recognized, shareholders are in fact situated
differently from other stakeholders, particularly other capital
providers, when it comes to their contractual vulnerability.81 They
have invested their money into the firm with no ability to withdraw
78. See id.
79. See Coase, supra note 66, at 391–93 (discussing why production is
organized through firms, rather than markets).
80. See Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 59, at 2113
(discussing the “strange turn” from stakeholder theory to the exclusive
shareholder franchise). Stakeholder theorists have acknowledged this difficulty.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 312 (“Recognizing that shareholder voting
rights can act as a safety net to protect against extreme misconduct poses
something of a problem for the mediating hierarchy approach, as it suggests that
shareholders enjoy more control over how the firm is run than do other members
of the coalition.”).
81. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 68–69; Benjamin
Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1161, 1197 (2010) (discussing the problem of “shareholder oppression” and
vulnerability, and the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such
shareholders).
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it and subject to uncertain payoffs, largely at the discretion of
management.82 However, employees are also firm investors. They
have invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual
capital in the firm and cannot not pull these investments out.83 By
law and by norms, they are compensated on a more regular basis,
and with less discretion, than shareholders.84 However, they are
still significantly more attached to the firm, and within the
auspices of the firm, than the other stakeholders.85
Moreover, the theory of the firm provides support for a
governance model that includes employees. Theory of the firm
scholars have long appreciated the importance of the employee to
our conception of the firm.86 In fact, Ronald Coase looked to the
relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate
82. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV.
387, 392 (2003) (citing the importance of “resource commitment” or capital lock-in
as a critical reason for the success of the corporation as a private enterprise).
83. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 283, 302 (1998) (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker more
valuable to her present employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm’s
opportunistic behavior”); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law:
Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 368 (2010) (“For
instance, employees may make an investment in corporations by way of
undergoing specialised training that might not be able to be used elsewhere in
other employment.”).
84. As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long
as a year and were not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the
end. See, e.g., Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267, 292–94 (1824) (denying any
contractual recovery for an employee who left after nine months of a
twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 491–92 (1834) (denying
contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under restitution). Now, however,
wage and hour laws require payment for time worked and periodic payments
made to the employee. See generally The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub.
L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012)).
85. There may be certain exceptions in unusual situations. See HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 149–223 (1996) (discussing specific
instances of customer-owned enterprises); David G. Yosifon, The Consumer
Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) [hereinafter Yosifon,
Consumer Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately represented in
corporate governance); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the
Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Lock-in]
(concluding that “a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm
and an embrace of a multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime may be
necessary to overcome agency problems associated with consumer lock-in”).
86. See generally Coase, supra note 66, at 401–05.
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empirical support for his theory of the firm.87 Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz argued that the importance of the firm (as
separate from the market) stems from the need to coordinate
production from a variety of inputs.88 They defined team
production as “production in which 1) several types of resources
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of
each cooperating resource.”89 Team production is used—and firms
replace markets—when the coordinated effort increases
productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with
monitoring and disciplining the team.90 Margaret Blair and Lynn
Stout relied on this notion of team production in developing their
stakeholder-based theory.91 But the non-separable inputs within
team production really belong to employees and shareholders.92
Shareholders provide capital that is taken within the firm and
turned into discretionary funds.93 Employees work together under
the aegis of the firm to produce goods or services in a manner that
generally cannot be separated out to assign specific values.94 All
other participants do not really engage in the team production
process, and, thus, do not need to work within the firm.95 Creditors
provide money on fixed terms.96 Suppliers and independent
87. See id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a
firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”).
88. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972) (describing the
firm as a “centralized contractual agent in a team production process”).
89. Id. at 779.
90. Id. at 780.
91. See Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 275 (analyzing the “team production
problem” arising “when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific
resources to produce a nonseparable output”).
92. See id. at 249 (“If the team members’ investments are
firm-specific . . . and if output from the enterprise is nonseparable, . . . serious
problems can arise in determining how any economic surpluses generated by
team production . . . should be divided.”).
93. See id. at 277 (“Providers of financial capital—shareholders and even,
potentially, some creditors—are, by this agreement, just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as
are providers of specialized human capital.”).
94. Id. at 261.
95. See id. at 269 (arguing that “employees, shareholders, and executives”
are the main players on the corporate “team”).
96. But cf. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652–55 (2002) (arguing that
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contractors provide specific services outside of the firm’s scope.
Consumers purchase the goods or services after the production
process is complete.97 And the surrounding community regulates
the firm as it does all other individuals and organizations within
its jurisdiction. Yes, it is fair to say that all of these participants
are engaged in the production process. But then all participants in
the market are engaged in commerce with one another. It is only
when we have a team production process—when the parties cannot
effectively use the market—that we need to create a firm and
facilitate the process of team production.98 Employees and
shareholders are part of that team production process in a way that
stakeholders outside the firm are not.
There has been some recognition within progressive corporate
law that employees may be different than other stakeholders. Kent
Greenfield has long advocated for a special role for employees in
corporate law, including the possibility of board representation.99
Brett McDonnell has studied and advocated for various forms of
worker participation in governance, including employee
ownership.100 Marleen O’Connor’s work has largely focused on
protecting employees through fiduciary duties and statutory
rights.101 However, most communitarian and/or stakeholder
theorists desire to encompass a complete and variegated
“[t]here is no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations
thereby make a team-specific investment” but that they are “less vulnerable to
opportunism when trading with publicly held corporations” when compared to
other team members).
97. See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 85, at 259 (discussing the
cabined role of some consumers in the transacting process).
98. See id. at 265 (“If the activities and inputs of those participants are
adequately coordinated, their collective output can be qualitatively different and
vastly larger than the sum of what each individual could produce separately.”).
99. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 112 (2006).
100. See Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate
Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2011) (evaluating “a number
of possible strategies for creating a role for employees in corporate governance”);
see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 (2008) (promoting
employee primacy).
101. See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers,
69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American
Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000).
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assemblage of stakeholders.102 To provide one (topical) example,
David Millon has acknowledged that “[t]he most compelling
theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have focused
on employees,” and that “the relative inadequacy of bargaining
power and other disadvantages may more seriously impede
bargained-for protection for employees than for other
nonshareholder groups.”103 However, he ultimately has rejected a
shareholder-employee model on the grounds that “the idea of the
corporation as a community would not justify a model that
disregarded the interests of other nonshareholder groups.”104
Other stakeholder theorists have agreed.105
Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable
and may, in some circumstances, warrant a species of governance
protection.106 Creditors, for example, may receive specific
protections when the company is close to bankruptcy as a way of
mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such situations.107
102. See, e.g., Keay, supra note 83, at 255–56 (“A stakeholder approach . . . is
premised on the notion that an inclusive approach towards all contributors is—
from a social, economic and political perspective—valuable.”).
103. Millon, Foundations, supra note 5, at 19.
104. Id. at 14.
105. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 255
Because this view challenges the shareholder primacy norm that has
come to dominate the theoretical literature, our analysis appears to
parallel many of the arguments raised in recent years by the
“communitarian” or “progressive” school of corporate scholars who
believe that corporate law ought to require directors to serve not only
the shareholders’ interests, but also those of employees, consumers,
creditors, and other corporate “stakeholders.”
106. See id. at 275 (“[T]he public corporation is not so much a ‘nexus of
contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in which
several different groups contribute unique and essential resources to
the corporate enterprise, and who each find it difficult to protect their
contribution through explicit contracts.”).
107. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as
Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 296 (2015) (“[C]ourts should revert
to their traditional focus on policing against the bargaining failures that can occur
when investors use directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges
that are replete in corporate finance.”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board
Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57
UCLA L. REV. 115, 119 (2009) [hereinafter Tung, Leverage] (arguing that “bank
creditors and other private lenders often enjoy significant oversight and influence
over managerial decisions”). For a discussion of the possible expansion of
fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract:
Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 814–15
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Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested
interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may
make sense.108 In the main, however, regulation will be the most
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not
amenable to contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory
rights within bankruptcy.109 Consumer protection laws can place
mandatory terms or disclosure requirements on firms.110
Environmental protections address externalities by imposing costs
on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities.111 But
corporate governance, like all firm governance, should be
addressed to solving problems that arise within the firm
structure—problems related to team production.112 And employees
(2008) [hereinafter Tung, Fiduciary Duties].
108. See HANSMANN, supra note 85, at 149–68 (discussing consumer
ownership); Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 85, at 1449–59 (discussing types of lockin situations).
109. See Tung, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 107, at 842 (“By the time the
firm is in distress, its creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and
priority rights), differing stakes in the continuation of the borrower firm, and
differing contract protections.”).
110. Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1147, 1169 (2010) (“Despite the many state and federal statutes that
have been enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the
underlying contract between the company and the consumer remains crucial in
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.”).
111. I understand that stakeholder theorists may not want to assign
responsibility for the environment purely to environmental regulations, since the
fate of our planet is of utmost importance. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, NASCAR
Green: The Problem of Sustainability in Corporations and Corporate Law, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 491, 491 (2011) (“Slowing down and ultimately reversing
global warming is the preeminent global challenge of our time.”). But corporate
law concerns internal governance, not environmental regulation. For those
businesses that want to bake environmental sustainability or other socially
beneficial missions into their organizational DNA, most states are now providing
the benefit corporation as a legal form for channeling such focus. See, e.g., Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S.
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 612 (2017) (defining benefit
corporations as “corporations organized for the express purpose of realizing both
financial wealth for shareholders and articulated social or environmental
benefits”); Matthew J. Dulac, Note, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation:
Benefit Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 173–79
(2015) (providing a “primer” on benefit corporations and sustainability).
112. See Blair & Stout, supra note 45, at 250 (“[P]ublic corporation law can
offer a second-best solution to team production problems because it allows
rational individuals who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking
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and shareholders are the two primary groups that are engaged in
the process of team production within the firm.113
And the fate of employees should be of particular concern to
progressives’ hearts. The late nineteenth century progressive
movement sought to empower family farmers and industrial
laborers against trusts, robber barons, company towns, corrupt
governments, and other forms of entrenched power.114 We are faced
today with a similar sense of alienation and powerlessness in the
face of multinational corporations and global governments that
seem, to many, radically disconnected from their daily lives.115
Employees have no official voice in the corporate structure, and
they often have little unofficial voice within the workplace.116
Decisions are made through a hierarchical structure in which the
employee plays no part.117 Labor unions, which had been the
primary vehicle for worker engagement with their companies, now
represent less than seven percent of the private workforce.118
Employees have been separated from the corporations for which
they work.119
and rent-seeking by opting into an internal governance structure we call the
‘mediating hierarchy.’”).
113. Note that an employee-equity governance structure for the firm would
still align with William Bratton’s description of the corporate purpose: “corporate
law should facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and
hence wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment at the
lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control externalities.”
Bratton, supra note 34, at 723–24.
114. See Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate
America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder
Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 911 (1996) (discussing “an age of robber
barons, monopolies, trusts, and moguls” that led to the progressive movement).
115. See, e.g., Bernie Sanders, Where the Democrats Go from Here, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2016, at A25 (“Over the last 30 years, too many Americans were sold out
by their corporate bosses.”).
116. See McDonnell, supra note 100, at 429 (noting that “corporate law does
nothing to encourage any role for employees in corporate governance”).
117. See id. at 433 (“[I]n large U.S. corporations . . . employees frequently
have a suboptimal level of involvement in decision making.”).
118. See Economic News Release: Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nr0.htm (last edited Jan. 26, 2017) (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Publicsector workers had a union membership rate (35.2 percent) more than five times
higher than that of private-sector workers (6.7 percent).”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. Dalia Tsuk has argued that this process happened as a result of several
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But what actual role can employees play in corporate
governance? The next Section begins to consider some possible
approaches.
IV. The Need for Structural Corporate Law Reform
In the recent case of eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark,120 former Delaware Chancellor Chandler dismayed
many stakeholder theorists by reaffirming corporate law’s
commitment to shareholder primacy.121 In discussing an action by
the original founders of craigslist to adopt a shareholders’ rights
plan, Chancellor Chandler stated:
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an
organization seeking to aid local, national, and global
communities by providing a website for online classifieds that
is largely devoid of monetized elements. . . . [The majority
shareholders, however,] opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a
for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted
millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby
eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form.
forces, including academics:
Focusing on major issues in corporate law—the nature of corporate
entities and corporate power—this Article explores how, in the course
of the twentieth century, legal scholars and political theorists helped
remove the interests of workers (as differentiated from shareholders,
officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate law and
theory. It demonstrates how scholars’ conversations about corporate
entities and corporate power were influenced by a shared cultural and
intellectual objection to Marxist class analysis with its focus on the
proletariat. It further explicates how the purging of the working class
from scholarly imagination paved a way, first, for the rise of the new
classes of managers and owners and the shareholder-centered vision of
corporate law and, then, for the emergence of a narrow,
shareholder-wealth-maximization norm, which is being questioned
today.
Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003).
120. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2010).
121. See id. at 34 (refusing to “accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of
a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”).
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Those standards include acting to promote the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after
the company name has to mean at least that.122

The eBay decision was disheartening for stakeholder theorists
because of its express ratification of shareholder primacy. Up until
eBay, stakeholder supporters could plausibly argue that Delaware
law hovered somewhere between shareholder primacy and
stakeholder theory.123 For every Revlon124 case requiring
shareholder wealth maximization, there was a Time Warner v.
Paramount125 allowing boards to take actions that would only favor
shareholders indirectly, or over the long term.126
Despite the result in eBay, stakeholder theorists have not
given up the hope for doctrinal victories. Indeed, in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, Inc.,127 the Supreme Court seemed to adopt, to some
extent, a stakeholder theory of the corporation for purposes of
determining its religious character.128 The Court’s willingness to
depart from shareholder primacy arguably made the case a
positive development for progressive corporate law.129 As Lyman
122. Id.
123. For a discussion of the yin and yang of corporate law theory, see
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 1385, 1386 (2008) (“[C]orporate law is, and will remain, deeply ambivalent—
both doctrinally and morally—with respect to each of three fundamental and
related issues: the locus of ultimate corporate governance authority, the intended
beneficiaries of corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law
and the achievement of the social good.”).
124. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
125. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
126. Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (“O]btaining the highest price for the
benefit of the stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director
action.”), with Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1142 (“We also find that Time’s
board did not by entering into its initial merger agreement with Warner come
under a Revlon duty either to auction the company or to maximize short-term
shareholder value, notwithstanding the unequal share exchange.”).
127. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
128. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L.
REV. 777, 803 (2015) (finding that when the Court speaks of shareholders, officers,
and employees as relevant corporate actors, “[t]his suggests more of a stakeholder
conception of the corporation, not a shareholder conception”).
129. See id. at 822 (“The liberal and progressive agenda within corporate law
is to create as much legal, practical, and ideological space as possible for
corporations that pursue a variety of social values while still looking to make
some money. Justice Alito’s opinion fits readily within that agenda.”). But see Leo
E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate
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Johnson and David Millon have claimed, “[t]his judicial
endorsement [in Hobby Lobby] likely will further legitimate
corporate goals other than profit maximization.”130
Ultimately, however, this is just palace intrigue. The power
structures are already in place. As Delaware Supreme Court Chief
Justice Leo Strine has put it, in his inimitable way:
In current corporate law scholarship, there is a tendency among
those who believe that corporations should be more socially
responsible to avoid the more difficult and important task of
advocating for externality regulation of corporations in a
globalizing economy and encouraging institutional investors to
exercise their power as stockholders responsibly. Instead, these
advocates for corporate social responsibility pretend that
directors do not have to make stockholder welfare the sole end
of corporate governance, within the limits of their legal
discretion, under the law of the most important American
jurisdiction—Delaware.
According to these commentators, if only corporate directors
recognized that the stockholders are just one of many ends they
can legally pursue, the world would be a better place. Corporate
directors, under this rosy view, may consider any or all of the
following to be ends as important, or even more important, than
the economic well-being of the corporation’s stockholders: the
employees, the customers of the corporation, the environment,
charitable causes, the communities within which the
corporation operates, and society generally.
These well-meaning commentators, of course, ignore certain
structural features of corporation law that folks like Madison
and Hamilton would have thought important. The contention
that [§ 101(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”)] proves directors are free to promote interests other
than those of stockholders ignores the many ways in which the
DGCL focuses corporate managers on stockholder welfare by
allocating power only to a single constituency, the stockholders.
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 110 (2015) (“Put
simply, these other constituencies appear to have been useful purely as an
instrument to the majority’s justification for allowing corporate managers to use
the corporate entity as a vehicle for the expression of their own religious beliefs,
solely by virtue of having managerial control.”).
130. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 25 (2015); see also id. at 31 (“Here the United States Supreme Court
speaks clearly to the fundamental issue of corporate purpose and states correctly
that corporate law authorizes non-profit-maximizing behavior.”).
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Under the DGCL, only stockholders have the right to vote for
directors; approve certificate amendments; amend the bylaws;
approve certain other transactions, such as mergers, and
certain asset sales and leases; and enforce the DGCL’s terms
and hold directors accountable for honoring their fiduciary
duties. In the corporate republic, no constituency other than
stockholders is given any power.131

I understand the desire of progressives to influence the
Delaware chancellors and justices and to ameliorate some of the
harsh effects that a focus on short-term share price can bring.
(Indeed, the Chief Justice understands this desire as well.132) And
I do not mean to diminish the impact of either Delaware corporate
law doctrine or its hortatory rhetoric in shaping behavior in
boardrooms across America.133 However, fighting over the extent
to which courts embrace the ideology of shareholder primacy
should not be the only, or even the primary, grounds upon which
the academic battles rage. Changes in the power structure are
necessary to effectuate much of what a progressive corporate law
would seek to accomplish.134 But there is no meaningful
alternative.
Thus, progressive corporate law must turn its attention to the
kind of reforms that would bring about meaningful change. The
progressive corporate law agenda must include changes to the
131. Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763–66
(2015); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That
for-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135–36 (2012)
(“[T]he continued failure of our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the
for-profit corporation endangers the public interest.”).
132. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic, supra note 21, at 1769–70
(arguing against a shareholder-primacy approach that in his view “put[s] too
much power in the hands of institutional investors with short-term interests”).
133. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (“Delaware courts fill out the
concept of ‘good faith’ through fact-intensive, normatively saturated descriptions
of manager, director, and lawyer conduct, and of process—descriptions that are
not reducible to rules . . . .”).
134. Providing for employee participation in corporate governance would
require changing state corporate law or superseding provisions of federal law. For
an example of providing for such participation through a nonbinding employee
vote on transformative transactions, see Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information,
and Corporate Combinations: The Case for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in
Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 871 (2007).
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statutory structure that would better accomplish the distribution
of power within the firm.135 Such a task may not only seem
impossible—it may seem outside the institutional competence of
law professors, and it may seem extremely unlikely to occur. But
otherwise, we are stuck arguing about the dicta used in the eBay
and Hobby Lobby opinions.136 We should aim higher.
At the same time, we should look to shape corporate behavior
in ways beyond those traditional pillars of corporate law—voting
rights and fiduciary duties. Corporations are already beginning to
experiment in greater numbers with different forms of employee
participation in internal firm governance.137 It may be that the real
action is within the corporation’s internal governance structure,
operating within the loose legal constraints that corporate law
imposes.138 But corporate law may nevertheless still have a role to
play in managing the boundaries of these internal structures and
providing incentives to the firm to adopt employee-friendly
policies. Federal employee benefits law has very successfully
provided carrots and sticks to encourage companies to create and
maintain appropriate employee pension and welfare benefits.139 A
similar scheme could encourage companies to provide greater
employee participation within the governance of a firm.

135. For purposes of this essay, I leave aside the question of whether the most
efficient result is by definition the most just result.
136. As Johnson and Millon recognize, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby
opinion has no direct effect on state corporate law doctrine and has at most
“persuasive force.” Johnson & Millon, supra note 130, at 24 (“[T]he Court’s views
on corporate purpose would not be binding in the context of a state law dispute
on the issue of permitted (or mandated) corporate purpose, if the state’s highest
court had decided otherwise or the state legislature had amended the corporate
statute.”).
137. For a description of one such system known as “holacracy,” see BRIAN J.
ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING
WORLD (2015); Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the Holacracy Hype, HARV. BUS.
REV. 38 (July–Aug. 2016).
138. See Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of “Team”
Production of Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2015) (“Real
governance power lies elsewhere, and largely outside of the gaze of modern
corporate law scholarship.”).
139. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, “Ninety-Five Percent of [Them] Will Not Be
Missed”: Recovering the Tax Shelter Limitation Aspect of ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV.
515, 517 (2014) (discussing ERISA’s “preferential tax treatment on plans
providing retirement savings to a broad cross-section of the workforce”).
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The siren call of a citation from the Chancery Court is strong.
But progressive corporate law scholars have for too long focused on
copacetic judicial opinions as the highest metric of success.
Instead, we must look to facilitate different governance structures
and encourage those models that best provide more meaningful
participation.140 We should look to the theory of the firm for our
methodological foundation, but we should also look to real world
companies to provide concrete examples of the kinds of
organization we want to champion.
V. Conclusion
My thanks to Lyman Johnson and David Millon for their
foundational opposition to mainstream corporate law and
economics. The lessons of their research are manifold and
long-lasting, and I look forward to engaging with their work for
years to come. But the progressive corporate law movement has hit
something of a dead end. We must move our methodological
attention to the theory of the firm, focus on the role of employees
within the corporation, and reimagine the basic power structures
that frame corporate law. If we do these things, we will have a true
alternative to shareholder primacy, along with a bedrock of
interdisciplinary research to back it up.

140. See Justin Blount, Creating A Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing
Corporate Law, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365, 370 (2016) (setting forth “different
methods for how a stakeholder governed corporate structure could be created
under this extant legal structure”).

